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Abstract
Background: data on cocaine market appear to be inconsistent, as
they tend to show declining prices vis a vis a steady or increasing de-
mand and a declining supply. This paper proposes an explanation by
providing evidence of an under-estimation of the supply of cocaine.
Methods: we put forwa d a conservative estimate of cocaine pro-
duction in Colombia for year 2008 by means of reported seizures of
laboratories made by the counteracting organisations operating in the
Colombian territory.
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Results: our estimate is at least twice than that declared in the of-
ficial statistics, although we are careful to keep all of our variables to
their minimum boundary values. We conclude that our methodology
could prove to be a very useful tool especially if used in parallel with
the standard ones. Moreover, its characteristics (cheapness, ease of use
and possibility to adopt it all over the world) make of it a powerful
instrument for the counteracting activity against cocaine production.
Introduction
It is now a commonly agreed fact that scholars do not agree on the reliability
of the data utilised in the studies on drug–related issues.
The illegal nature of the market for drugs implies, first of all, that direct
measurement of the phenomenon is very difficult, and that, by relying on
indirect measurements, at each step some assumptions on latent variables
have to be made, and each assumption, far from being neutral, comes at a
price (Thoumi, 2005). For instance, there is not a proper market indicat-
ing quality or scarcity as function of price “only”. Moreover, total quantity
of hectares cultivated has to be estimated and this estimate makes use of
a set of correction factors and transformation coefficients that increases the
uncertainty surrounding the final estimate (see, for instance, the very high
number of caveats accompanying Table 19 of UNODC (2010, p. 162) on
“Global illicit cultivation of coca bush and production of coca leaf and co-
caine, 1995-2009”). This adds a bias for each step, which results in huge
distortions in the final data produced. Moreover, being the methodology not
well established and therefore ‘constant’, even the same data can (and fre-
quently do) lead to very different results and interpretations. To this adds
the fact that not all the final users of so–produced data “somehow seek in-
contestable figures that may be used and exploited, dismissing uncertainties
and statistical weaknesses, as well as the figures “conceptual complexities”
(Thoumi, 2005, p. 186).
From the methodological point of view, it can be shown that by taking
into account the true dynamic nature of such a market, the standard results
of comparative static economic analysis (Caulkins et al., 2006) can be over-
turned. In particular, Nell (1994) shows that, by taking into account a truly
dynamical approach, irreversibilities arise such that the development process
of the counteracting activities will likely enter phases of lock-in. The net
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result is thus not only that attempts at eradicating cultivations will fail, but,
even worse, these activities are likely to expand the market. Furthermore, the
effects of socio-political activities (Reuter, 2001; Thoumi, 2002) that overlap
with the economic side, have surely an important role, that is almost always
underplayed by the various models.
As a result of these difficulties, data on supply and demand are thoroughly
inconsistent with price dynamics, and thus frequently ad–hoc explanations
are put forward. In order to cope with this issue, we try to deal with cocaine
production by advocating to a completely different methodology, in order to
have an alternative estimate of it consistent with the global picture. We aim
thus to furnishing some additional tools to complement the more standard
ones. With this purpose in mind, we have collected on a daily basis all the
data on seizures of laboratories producing cocaine performed in 2008 by all
the counteracting organisations operating on the field in Colombia (i.e. all
the legal organisations deliberately intervening against drug trafficking in or-
der to reduce its force or neutralize it). The setting for our study is Colombia,
a good laboratory since almost all of the cocaine consumed in North Amer-
ica and Europe comes from the Andean nations of Bolivia, Colombia and
Peru`: according to the Colombia coca survey for 2008 (UNODC, 2009a,b),
Colombia accounts for more than the 50% of world cocaine production (its
share was more than 60% in 2007). In so doing, we aim at showing that it
is possible to obtain an estimate of cocaine production in Colombia based
on a dataset never used before, and that can help in gaining more insight in
understanding such a complex phenomenon.
Demand and supply in the cocaine market and
limits to standard evaluations methods
In analysing official statistics on cocaine market, some awkward stylised facts
emerge relative to the price/production relationship. Indeed, we observe a
long–term decreasing global trend in the price of cocaine (bottom panel of
Figure 1), vi-a-vis a more or less constant level of cocaine purity (top panel
of Figure 1).
Although there have been some fluctuations over the years, the downward
trend is quite evident, as to every spike in price, consumers adjusted to
changed availability and suppliers reacted to higher profits presumably with
3
P
ub
lis
he
d
on
th
e
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l J
ou
rn
al
of
D
ru
g
P
ol
ic
y
new entries (Figure 1 is taken from Fries et al. (2008), who produced the
report “under contract to the ONCDP” and base their estimates on STRIDE
data).
A steep decline in price would be compatible with either a decline in
demand or an increase in supply or both. As far as demand is concerned,
official data are quite clear in contrasting a declining demand in the US to
an increasing demand in the rest of the world, thus consolidating an overall
increase in world demand for cocaine (UNODC, 2010). Also the data on
prevalence show a stable patterns in USA since 2000 (with a slight decline
in the last two years), and an increasing pattern for some EU countries and
a stable one for the rest. However, all these countries show very consistent
increase in prevalence during the last 10 years. The global values of preva-
lence (UNODC, 2010, p. 68) confirms a long–term incre se since 2000, with
an overall stability in the last 3 years. Hence, data on single regions and/or
nations reveal unequivocally an increase in all the indicators regarding world
prevalence and demand.
As far as supply side is concerned, all the available official data point to
a decrease in supply as result of a set of exogenous shocks in production (i.e.
increasing eradication and aerial spraying of cocaine plants, together with
increasing seizures of laboratories) and distribution (i.e. increasing activities
against cross–border trafficking and increasing pressure on retail markets).
As result of this counteracting activities, official data (i.e. data from UN-
ODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime)) record a large decrease
in coca cultivation in Colombia (58% less in the period 2000-2009), which
gives a total production of pure cocaine of 450 metric tons in 2008 (and
the decrease is expected also in 2009), which is the lowest level since 2002.
This is mainly due to a strong decrease in the area under coca cultivation
(which decreased by 16% with respect to 2008 to a total of 68,000 ha). The
programs of manual eradication and aerial spraying show a decrease in 2009
after consistent increases in the three previous years. Also seizures of labo-
ratories have recorded a steady growth to reach the peak since 1990 of more
than 500 metric tons in 2008 (UNODC, 2010).
In the light of these data, the decline in the price of cocaine is quite puz-
zling, to the point that, on the one side, even UNODC is forced to concede
that something must have been happening to justify this conundrum, such
as, “the amount used by each consumer must have declined significantly”,
or “laboratory efficiency may have increased stronger than is currently re-
flected in cocaine production estimates” (UNODC, 2010, p. 68), but both
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statements are hard to prove as there are no official data available. On the
other side, scholars are forced to investigate the issue by means of ad–hoc
explanations. For instance, once some of the most violent dealers (i.e. the
dealers who are more likely to be arrested) are removed from the market,
a decrease in price can be observed (rather than an increase) because the
exit of a dealer does not reduce supply (because of the existence a cue of
new entrants) and, moreover, the likely entrance of less violent dealers will
reduce external costs for other dealers, in turn causing a reduction in price
(Caulkins et al., 2006). Similarly, another model advocates to globalisation
and to differentiated types of dealers to show that globalisation reduces prices
through the joint action of decreasing intermediation margins and an inflow of
newcomers low–level dealers attracted by high profits gained by upper–level
dealers (Costa-Storti and De Grauwe, 2009; Costa Storti and De Grauwe,
2009).
In order to make sense of these puzzling phenomenon, we propose an
alternative explanation. Our claim is that official statistics from UNODC
and ONDCP (US Government White House Office of Drug Control Policy),
despite their huge efforts and the important results obtained in counteract-
ing cocaine production, are likely to under–estimate the real production of
cocaine in Colombia. In particular, the procedure used for the interpre-
tation and processing of satellite images of coca crops to produce an esti-
mate of potential cocaine production in Andean regions have some inevitable
drawbacks, as suggested by the extant literature (Thoumi, 2005; Mejia and
Posada, 2008). First, satellite images used by official agencies providing of-
ficial statistics on cocaine production in Colombia do not cover the whole
country. Although this can be explained by the fact that some areas do not
have a soil susceptible of cocaine plant cultivation, this can actually miss
some important areas where coca is actually grown. For example, the de-
partments of Meta and Vichada are only partially covered by satellite images
available to UNODC for the estimate of potential production of cocaine in
Colombia in 2008 (UNODC, 2009a, p. 88). However, information on seizures
of laboratories contained in our study reveal that a relevant number of highly
productive laboratories are actually seized in these two areas (see Table 3).
Second, an estimation of the potential production of pure cocaine inevitably
requires several corrections (e.g. cloud cover, gaps, spraying, etc.) and as-
sumptions (e.g. yield per hectare, transformation coefficients from cocaine
base to cocaine hydrochloride, etc.) that can introduce a certain level of un-
certainty on the final estimate of pure cocaine produced (UNODC, 2009a).
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Finally, increasing evidence show how coca growers are likely to induce a
strong bias in the figures of coca cultivation gathered through satellite im-
ages by intermingling coca crops with legal crops to avoid both monitoring
and eradication (Thoumi, 2005; Mejia and Posada, 2008).
Although a very intense activity of verification through field work is car-
ried out by the official agencies, still a number of drawbacks are sources of
bias in the statistics on cocaine production. Therefore, our aim is to put
forward a completely new dataset, with which we aim at complementing ex-
isting estimates on the amount of cocaine produced in Colombia in 2008.
Our dataset allows us to supply a data on production which fits with the
available picture of the cocaine market, thus supplying an explanation to the
decrease of both retail prices and intermediation margins, in this way comple-
menting the hypothesis developed by Caulkins et al. (2006) and Costa-Storti
and De Grauwe (2009); Costa Storti and De Grauwe (2009). Moreover, our
methodology can be used to complement the available statistics in order to
get more reliable data to comprehend this phenomenon.
The dataset
The data we use in this paper have been collected by Sandro Donati, on a
daily basis, from the press releases published on the websites, of all the main
organisations — National Police (Polic´ıa Nacional), National Army (Ejercito
Nacional), Colombian Navy (Armada Nacional), Security Service Agency
(Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad, DAS) — through all their main
articulations (Divisions, Brigades, Battalions) covering more than 600 differ-
ent territorial units performing counteracting activities on the Colombian
territory. In this way, we have been able to gather data detailing each single
seizure of laboratories for the production of cocaine hydrochloride. Thus, we
have information on the final step of the manufacturing process of cocaine
which yields the final product with an average purity level close to 100%. For
each seizure a press release is published by the organisation that accomplished
the operation reporting several information: the geographical location where
the seizure took place; the number of people involved; the quantity of either
cocaine leaves, cocaine base or cocaine hydrochloride; the quantity of both
solid (e.g. potassium permanganate) and liquid (e.g. kerosene) chemical pre-
cursors; the number and the type of instruments seized (such as microwave,
scales, compressors, etc.). For a certain number of laboratories seized, an
6
P
ub
lis
he
d
on
th
e
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l J
ou
rn
al
of
D
ru
g
P
ol
ic
y
expert evaluation of the monthly production potential of that particular lab-
oratory is supplied (normally by a chemist following the counteracting unit).
Several procedures have been put forward to clean the dataset. First of
all, the data have been cross–checked in order to avoid duplication due to
different counteracting units reporting the same seizure. Furthermore, we
accounted for the high level of clusterisation of laboratories seized that we
noticed from time to time. This was mainly due to particularly complex oper-
ations set up by a particular counteracting unit which resulted in expeditions
lasting for several days in areas far from the home base. In all of these cases,
the counteracting unit was reporting the information only once the mission
was accomplished thus providing severe outliers in our dataset. To overcome
such a problem, we looked for collateral information (e.g. press releases from
local and national newspapers, details in the press releases from the counter-
acting organisations, etc.) which allowed us to split the data across different
laboratories. Finally, in order to avoid replications that might have gone
unnoticed, in case of seizures of laboratories occurring during the same day
in the same region, we opted for including only one.
After the cleaning–up, the dataset comprises 306 counteracting operations
carried out during the period between the 1st of January and the 31st of
December 2008. In this time span, the 306 operations led to the seizures
of 333 laboratories (called cristalizaderos) during the whole year 2008. For
some of them, relevant information is missing and leaves us with a workable
sample containing 328 laboratories.
We acknowledge the fact that these laboratories do not constitute a ran-
dom sample of the entire population of laboratories active in Colombia in
2008. More specifically, the representativity of the sample cannot be checked
because information concerning the distribution of the population of labora-
tories in Colombia is not available. Nevertheless, we propose a comparison
of the distribution of the laboratories contained in our sample by the de-
partment where the laboratory was operating and the corresponding figures
contained in the coca cultivation survey 2008 published by the UNODC and
containing information on illegal laboratories destroyed as provided by the
national narcotics office of the Colombian government (UNODC, 2009b).
The comparison is presented in Table 1. Notably, the two distributions
are very similar and in this sense our sample resembles pretty closer the
distribution of seized laboratories provided by the Colombian government.
Table 2 presents the distribution of laboratories seized by region, month of
seizure and counteracting force. The largest part of the laboratories destroyed
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were in the regions of Pacific and Central. As for the month of seizure, the
sample is well distributed across all the months of the year thus supporting
the idea that the manufacturing of cocaine is a business going on all around
the year. Indeed, coca bushes can be grown and harvested year-round with
an average number of harvests of four per year (Mejia and Posada, 2008).
Finally, the army is the counteracting body most active in the destruction of
laboratories with a 52% of overall laboratories destroyed.
As far as the average potential production of cocaine of the laboratories
destroyed is concerned, our figures do not show stark differences between the
different counteracting bodies and the different months of the year. On the
contrary, figure 2 reports the distribution by region and highlights that the
regions of Meta-Guaviare, Pacific and Putumayo-Caqueta are those charac-
terised by highly productive laboratories compared to other regions.
Econometric model
Since our aim is to provide an estimate of the amount of cocaine hydrochloride
produced in Colombia during the year 2008, it is important to understand
that the production process of cocaine hydrochloride from coca leaves is a
chemical process that is typically performed in three steps:
1. Coca leaves are transformed into coca paste. The cocaine content of
the leaves (dampened with lime water or other alkali) is extracted by
means of kerosene, then with sulphuric acid a liquid solution of cocaine
sulphate is produced. From this solution cocaine base precipitates (coca
paste) with lime. Since this stage requires minimum levels of skills
and investment (the few chemicals needed are easy to find and cheap),
growers usually are able to produce coca paste, although, obviously,
some farmers simply sell the coca leaves.
2. Coca paste is transformed into cocaine base. Coca paste is cleaned
from impurities by means of sulphuric acid and potassium perman-
ganate. Again alkali are needed to precipitate the free base, which is
then dissolved in some types of solvents. Although this step requires
additional skills and investment, many coca growers also perform it.
3. Cocaine base is refined into cocaine hydrochloride. This is done by
adding concentrated hydrochloric acid that causes cocaine hydrochlo-
ride to sediment. This is a quite complex production process requiring
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more skills, chemicals and investments. This process is typically per-
formed in more sophisticated laboratories (cristalizaderos) usually run
by organised crime groups, which are targeted by the counteracting
units for their bigger scale of production, and this is the production
step which our data refer to.
We put forward an econometric model aimed at analysing more deeply the
production process of cocaine hydrochloride. In particular, we model the
relationship between the different production factors (inputs) and the final
product (output) in the production process of cocaine. As for the inputs of
production, cocaine can be produced in several ways, and variations with
regard to technique, reagents and ingredients are very likely. Nevertheless,
three main factors of production can be singled out: labour, microwave ovens,
chemical precursors (e.g. sulphuric acid, potassium permanganate, cocaine
base, ether, hydrochloric acid, acetone and ethyl ether) (United-Nations,
1986; Mejia and Posada, 2008; EMCDDA, 2008).
In particular, our unit of reference is the single observed laboratory pro-
ducing cocaine hydrochloride (cristalizaderos). By focusing on these labora-
tories as the final productive unit of pure cocaine, we are able to set aside
concerns regarding several issues, such as the average quality of cocaine and
the conversion of intermediate inputs of production deriving from other lab-
oratories, which usually negatively affects the results of other works in the
field (ONDCP, 2004; UNODC, 2009b).
We estimate two different models for the sample comprising full informa-
tion for 166 laboratories. First, we estimate a Cobb-Douglas functional form
(Cobb and Douglas, 1928) for the cocaine production function of the type:
LPotentialProductioni = β0 +
4∑
k=1
βkxik + γ
TZi + i (1)
where the dependent variable LPotentialProductioni is the natural loga-
rithm of the monthly potential production of cocaine of laboratory i. As
for the independent variables, the term
∑4
k=1 βkxik is composed of the four
inputs of production. LSolidPrecursorsi and LLiquidPrecursorsi are, re-
spectively, the natural logarithm of the amount of solid and liquid chemical
precursors of laboratory i. LEmployeesi is the natural logarithm of the num-
ber of people working in laboratory i. LOvensi is the natural logarithm of the
number of microwave ovens used in laboratory i. Zi is a vector of laboratory-
specific control variables; and i is the error term. In particular, we control
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for the effects stemming from the month of seizure, the counteracting body
carrying out the operation and geographical location by including a series of
specific dummies.
Second, we estimate a translog functional form (Christensen et al., 1971):
LPotentialProductioni = β0 +
4∑
k=1
βkxik +
4∑
k=1
4∑
j=1
βk,jxikxij + γ
TZi + i
where the dependent variable, the main inputs of production and the controls
are the same as in equation (1) while the term
∑4
k=1
∑4
j=1 βk,jxikxij contains
squared and interaction terms. When the latter term is equal to zero, the
translog model is reduced to a Cobb-Douglas one.
Our dataset contains detailed information about the inputs of production
for all the 328 laboratories contained in our sample, and 166 reports an
expert evaluation of the potential production. Thus, an estimate of the
potential production of these remaining laboratories is needed. To do that,
we approximate the production process of cocaine for the 162 laboratories
of which we lack an expert evaluation. We do so by estimating a ‘cocaine’
production function for the 166 laboratories of which we have an expert
evaluation and use the model to estimate the monthly production potential
for the remaining labs.
In this way, our dataset comprises 328 observations and, for each unit,
information about several dimensions of the production process, such as the
number of people involved, the quantity of cocaine leaves and cocaine hy-
drochloride; the quantity of both solid (e.g. potassium permanganate) and
liquid (e.g. kerosene) chemical precursors; the number and the type of instru-
ments seized (such as microwaves, scales, compressors, etc.); the geographical
location of the laboratory being seized and, for 166 units, an expert evalua-
tion — normally a chemist following the counteracting unit — of its monthly
production potential.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the above mentioned inputs
that are available for our sample of laboratories. As for chemical precursors,
quantities are reported according to the nature of the precursor itself. If
the precursor is a solid precursor, quantities are reported in metric tons
while if the precursor is a liquid precursor, the quantity is reported in cubic
meters. The conversion in the same unit of measurement would have needed
information on the specific density of the precursor under consideration. This
information is not available thus we decided to make two factors of production
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out of one, thus chemical precursors are divided between solid and liquid
precursors. The average laboratory employs 25 persons and processes cocaine
using 4 microwave ovens, 1.75 metric tons of solid precursors and 7 m3 of
liquid precursors. Its potential production amounts to 3.5 metric tons per
month.
As far as the correlation values among the independent regressors are
concerned, apart from liquid and solid precursors, that are likely to be com-
plementary inputs of production and for which the correlation value is the
highest (0.56), the correlation across the independent variables is low, thus
suggesting the absence of any relevant problems of multicollinearity. In order
to check for its presence, we computed a variance inflation factor for the two
variables. We found no indication of significant multi-collinearity amongst
the two independent variables (i.e. the Variance Inflation Factor is 2.10 for
solid precursors and 2.30 for liquid precursors, well below the threshold level
of 5).
Results
This section is divided into three subsections. First, we present the results of
the regression models proposed in the preceding section. Second, we provide
details on the computation of our own estimate for the total production of
cocaine in Colombia in 2008. Finally, we propose a set of validity tests aimed
at increasing the robustness of our results.
Econometric results
The results of the econometric analysis are illustrated in Table 4. Column
1 presents the estimates of the translog regression model while column 2
reports the results for the Cobb-Douglas model.
Let us first consider the results for the translog specification. No coeffi-
cient is found to be significantly different from zero. We also report an F-test
testing whether the term
∑4
k=1
∑4
j=1 βk,jxikxij equals zero. Given that we
cannot reject the null hypothesis at the 1% level, we find evidence that the
correct model to test is reduced to the Cobb-Douglas one.
Let us now focus on the results of the Cobb-Douglas model (column 2 in
Table 4). LSolidPrecursors exhibits positive coefficient, significant at the
5% confidence level. This means that the “solid precursors-cocaine” elastic-
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ity is equal to 0.4. LLiquidPrecursors exhibits a positive and significant
coefficient with an elasticity of 0.25. Finally LEmployee has a positive and
significant coefficient with an elasticity of 0.86 while LOven is not signifi-
cant. For the Cobb-Douglas specification we also test for the presence of
linear homogeneity in the production of cocaine. The null hypothesis of lin-
ear homogeneity cannot be rejected thus suggesting the presence of constant
returns to scale in the production of cocaine. This seems to indirectly confirm
that laboratories have not become more productive thus contradicting one
of the “hidden” reasons for labs increasing efficiency cited by the UNODC
(UNODC, 2005).
Estimates
By means of the proposed models, we put forward an estimate of the potential
production of cocaine as it has been accomplished by only those productive
units whose seizure has been reported during the year 2008 by Colombian
counteracting organisations. In this way we are able to provide an estimate
for all the 328 laboratories, also the ones lacking an estimate provided by the
seizing authorities.
The procedure to estimate the overall production of cocaine in Colombia
in 2008 is the following. First, the monthly potential production of cocaine is
estimated for each single laboratory contained in our sample using the results
from the two different models. Second, the estimated production in 2008 of
each laboratory is computed by multiplying the daily potential production
and the number of days in which the laboratory has been in existence starting
from the 1st of January 2008.
Before presenting the results of the estimation procedure we set forward
some adjustments to the procedure described above. It is worth stressing
that all of the mentioned statements are likely to provide downward estimates
and, for this reason, the final estimate of cocaine production for the year 2008
that we propose here is highly conservative in nature. Moreover, we propose
two different scenarios relating to the total amount of cocaine produced in
Colombia during the year 2008: (i) 1.96 standard errors lower than the point
estimate (yˆ−1.96∗se) and (ii) equivalent to the point estimate (yˆ). Third, it
must be recalled that we take into consideration only those laboratories that
have been seized and reported by Colombian authorities. It is the case that
not all of the productive laboratories are seized by the the counteracting
organisations, otherwise Colombia will produce no cocaine at all, while it
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is still internationally recognised as the major producer of cocaine in the
world. Fourth, if more than one laboratory is found to be seized in the same
locality, then we assume that any additional laboratories to the first one
actually constitutes a replacement of the seized one and, for this reason, it
contributes to the total estimate only for the additional days.
Given these conservative assumptions, the final numbers of our estimation
exercise (see Table 5) are quite interesting and, we believe, shed new light
on the way in which cocaine supply should be conceived by the relevant
literature.
Even in the most conservative scenario, that is when we subtract 1.96
times the standard error of the estimator to the point estimate, production
results to be 935 metric tons, a much higher value than the amount of cocaine
reported by the UNODC and the ONDCP reports (UNODC, 2009b; ONDCP,
2011), which amount respectively to 450 and 295 metric tons. The estimate
at the point estimate obtains the extremely large result of 2768 metric tons.
Validity tests
The final estimate provided in our work may be subject to several biases.
For instance, depending on the nature of the missing values in the potential
production of cocaine the coefficients estimated in our model can be biased.
When data are missing completely at random (MCAR) no bias in the co-
efficient would result from ignoring incomplete observations and thus the
estimate of missing values from the model would be correct. Thus, finding
support for a missing data mechanism of the MCAR type would strengthen
the reliability of our estimates. We propose two ways to check the credi-
bility of our assumption that the missing data mechanism contained in our
data is actually MCAR (see A for the details of the two procedures) and in
both cases we find support for our claim that the missing data mechanism is
completely random and adds no bias to our estimates.
In addition, we make some assumptions about the functional form of
the production function, in particular we assumed that a linear relationship
links the potential production of cocaine to the relevant inputs of produc-
tion. Indeed, Cobb-Douglas and translog production function models specify
in advance the form of the production function. While in a standard setting
these forms can be implemented reliably, we cannot assume the same in an
unusual setting such as the production of cocaine. For this reason, as a ro-
bustness check we implement a nonparametric regression approach (see B for
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details). The estimate of cocaine production in 2008 following this alterna-
tive model specification, is still much higher than the estimates provided by
official agencies (UNODC and ONDCP).
Third, the presence of severe outliers can actually bias our estimates. The
bias may arise from the presence of few highly productive units in our data
as evidenced by severe outliers. To cope with this limitation, we estimate a
quantile regression model (see C for details) but, even in this case, estimates
of total cocaine production for 2008 are still higher than official estimates.
Finally, the computation of the final estimate on the total production
of cocaine in Colombia in 2008 is based on the strong assumption that all
laboratories were in place at 1st January 2008. The average life length of a
laboratory contained in our sample is 99 days. As further robustness check,
we calculate the estimated total production for lower levels of average life
length of the laboratories under consideration. By doing so, we show that,
in order to reach an amount of cocaine production comparable to that from
official agencies, the average life length of the laboratories contained in our
sample should be reduced to 17 days. Unfortunately, there is no available
information on the real average life length of a laboratory producing cocaine
in Colombia but it looks reasonable to assume that it cannot be that short.
Building a secret laboratory in the Colombian jungle is a financial investment
which takes time and resources. Thus we expect crime groups to do that for
an expected return lasting, on average, at least more than 1 or 2 months.
If this is the case, then our estimate of the total production of cocaine in
Colombia in 2008 increases to more than 1,000 metric tons, far above the
one provided by UNODC and ONDCP.
Conclusion
In this paper, we put forward the idea that in cocaine–related studies the
reliability of empirical data available to researchers is crucial. Although we
witness a widespread interest in developing very visible policies heavily biased
towards contrasting drugs supply, the quality of the data produced is not
always following the trend. In an attempt to improve the reliability of data
collection, we put forward a unique dataset covering seizures of laboratories
for hydrochloride cocaine production in Colombia for the whole year 2008.
By means of this dataset, we compute a production level of 935 metric tons
in its lower boundary, which is more than twice than the official UNODC
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estimates. In our calculations we were keen to use whenever possible the
lowest boundaries of our estimates, in order not to inflate the final result.
A set of validity tests has been performed, in order to confirm that our
methodology is robust to a wide series of possible biases.
Our analysis shows that, on the grounds of a micro based dataset built
through an alternative methodology to those commonly used, it is possible to
contribute a meaningful analysis of such a complex phenomenon by overcom-
ing some of the limits of official statistics. We thus furnish a tool of analysis
that, if used together with the standard ones, could prove to be effective in
complementing the information derived from the more usual statistical tools.
Indeed, our effort is aimed at complementing, rather than challenging, the
standard methodologies, in order to provide a more realistic and reliable view
of such a complex phenomenon.
One last issue must be considered, related to the possible overestimation
that the expert could be doing in their estimates of the potential production
of the seized laboratory. Indeed, it might seem that counteracting forces
have an incentive to overreport the results of seizing activity in order to
show off. This also seems to be in line with recent findings obtained by
Matthew-Simmons et al. (2011) who show that enforcement data are not
always indicative of total supply, since there is a widely diffused effect of
overestimation of seizures. At this regards, however, our data do not suffer
from overestimation in their reporting, as they do not come from media
reports, but directly from th counteracting units report, which is not per se´
a cause of distortion.
However, more serious distortions might arise from other sources such as
strategic or illegal behaviour. Indeed, if we suppose a strategic use of data
on seizures, it might seem that a certain level of exaggeration in reporting
the quantity seized could be expected, in order to show that counteracting
units in general are effective in fighting against traffickers. However, by the
same token the expert estimation of the production capacity of the laborato-
ries should be kept lower than its true value (and not higher) since is seems
reasonable that to act strategically counteracting forces should overestimate
the quantity seized and underestimate potential production, in order to max-
imise their efficacy in counteracting illegal activities: “we seize a lot and thus
potential production goes down”.
Another source of distortion may come from illegal behaviour. If we
assume that part of the amount of cocaine seized is stolen by some members
of the counteracting unit then data on both the quantity of cocaine seized and
15
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potential production will be reduced in order to hide the stolen quantities.
Hence, in both cases, although we expect our data to be somehow bi-
ased, our expectations are that potential production could be even further
underestimated.
Finally, our dataset seems to be immune from distortion in over reporting,
as data are stationary (statistical tests are reported in Leoncini and Rentoc-
chini (2010)), with no structural break suggesting the existence of such a
phenomenon (apart from the October–December break, which is symmetri-
cal and is probably due to the substitution of high ranks in the Army).
Future works should try to address all the points raised above to extend
and complement our results. In spite of these limitations, we believe that our
proposed methodology could prove to be an effective tool to parallel official
statistics, as its main characteristics lend themselves to a wide diffusion of
its usage. Moreover, the data on production reveal that a further effort is
needed from the official agencies side in order to help practitioners to have
increasingly reliable data on such an important phenomenon.
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Figures
Figure 1: Price and purity of cocaine - Predicted price of one expected pure
gram of powder cocaine (bottom) and expected purity of powder cocaine
(top) compared to counterpart medians. Source: Fries et al. (2008)
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Figure 2: Monthly potential production of cocaine of seized laboratories by
region of seizure
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Tables
Table 1: Comparison of the number of laboratories seized by department in
2008: (a) our sample (b) UNODC report of year 2008 (UNODC, 2009b)
(a) (b) (a) (b)
Department Our UNODC Department Our UNODC
sample sample
Amazonas - - Guainia - -
Antioquia 32 37 Guaviare 2 2
Arauca 6 2 Magdalena 11 7
Atlantico 2 2 Meta 17 3
Bolivar 9 3 Narino 64 65
Boyaca 9 9 N. de Santander 49 27
Caldas 1 3 Putumayo 7 6
Caqueta 1 - Quindio 1 -
Casanare 5 - Risaralda - 1
Cauca 61 42 Santander 4 14
Cesar 7 5 Sucre 1 1
Choco 5 5 Tolima - 3
Cordoba 8 7 Tunja 2 -
Cundinamarca 3 6 Valle - 11
Guajira 1 - Vichada 20 6
Total 328 267
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Table 2: Distribution of seized laboratories by region, month of seizure and
counteracting force
Freq. % Freq. Freq. % Freq.
n=328 n=328
Region Month
Meta-Guaviare 19 5.8 Jan 27 8.2
Pacific 130 39.6 Feb 33 10.1
Putumayo-Caqueta 8 2.4 Mar 24 7.3
Central 122 37.2 Apr 33 10.1
Orinoco 26 7.9 May 30 9.1
Sierra Nevada 12 3.7 Jun 18 5.5
Other 11 3.3 Jul 30 9.1
Counteracting force Aug 23 7.0
National Army 171 52.1 Sep 35 10.7
National Police 125 38.1 Oct 44 13.4
Other (Colombian Navy & DAS) 32 9.8 Nov 22 6.7
Dec 9 2.7
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for the variables used in the econometric mod-
els
Potential
Production1
Solid
Precursors2
Liquid
Precursors3
Employees4 Ovens4
Mean 3.54 1.75 6.99 24.69 4.43
Median 2 0.51 2.67 23 2
Std.Dev 4.39 4.29 12.35 14.4 6.79
Min 0.03 0 0 4 0
Max 24 41.5 110.91 137 50
Obs 166 328 328 328 328
1metric tons per month; 2metric tons; 3cubic meters; 4n
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Table 4: Results of ‘Cocaine’ production function regression models: factors
influencing the monthly potential production of cocaine in Colombia for year
2008
Translog Cobb-Douglas
β0 Constant -2.272 -2.282*
(3.647) (1.192)
β1 LSolidPrecursors 1.460 0.397**
(1.316) (0.157)
β2 LLiquidPrecursors -0.920 0.253***
(0.822) (0.089)
β3 LEmployees 1.123 0.860***
(2.267) (0.305)
β4 LOven -0.785 -0.052
(0.699) (0.088)
β1,1 LSolidPrecursors sq 0.040
(0.342)
β3,3 LEmployees sq -0.216
(0.746)
β2,2 LLiquidPrecursors sq 0.235
(0.164)
β4,4 LOven sq 0.434*
(0.255)
β1,3 LSolidPXLEmpl -0.280
(0.437)
β1,4 LSolidPXLOven -0.048
(0.143)
β2,1 LLiquidPXLSolidP -0.056
(0.136)
β2,3 LLiquidPXLEmpl 0.275
(0.271)
β2,4 LLiquidPXLOven -0.105
(0.100)
β3,4 LEmplXLOven 0.117
(0.236)
Regional controls Included Included
Time controls Included Included
Count. force controls Included Included
F-test of Cobb-Douglas model 0.25(1, 132)
F-test of linear homogeneity 2.16(1, 142)
R2 0.550 0.512
F-test of joint significance 4.883(33) 9.521(23)
N 166 166
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 5: Comparison of overall estimates of cocaine production (in metric
tons) in Colombia for year 2008: (a) own estimate, (b) UNODC official
estimate (UNODC, 2009b), (c) ONDCP official estimate (ONDCP, 2011)
(a) (b) (c)
Our sample UNODC ONDCP
Total production (lowest boundary level)1 935 - -
Total production (point estimate)2 2768 - -
Total production - 450 295
1Result of the estimate produced with the Cobb-Douglas regression model keeping the
estimates at the lower boundary level (yˆ − 1.96 ∗ se)
2Result of the point estimate produced with the Cobb-Douglas regression model (yˆ)
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A Missing data
To account for the possibility of missing data, we hypothesise that the mech-
anism contained in our data is actually Missing Completely At Random
(MCAR) (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). First, we propose the results of the
following logit regression model:
Logit[DMissi|xik] = β0 +
10∑
k=1
βkxik + γ
TZi
where DMissi is a dichotomous variable taking value 1 if for that particu-
lar laboratory monthly potential production of cocaine was not provided by
the chemist following the counteracting unit and 0 otherwise.
∑10
k=1 xik are
a set of covariates synthetizing the information contained in our sample of
laboratories. Apart from the standard covariates used in the cocaine produc-
tion function contained in the text, we included ther variables (such as the
amount of cocaine base, the number of hectares used for coca production,
the amount of processed coca leaves and those before process etc.). Table 6
contains the results. Apart from the co stant term, no other coefficient is
significant at the usual significance levels thus supporting the claim that our
missing data mechanism is MCAR.
A more formal procedure has been carried out to provide further evidence
in favour of the MCAR nature of our missing data mechanism. In particular,
we calculate the test statistic proposed by Little (1988) as a test of MCAR
for multivariate data which yields a χ2(9) = 9.6. Thus, we do not reject
the null hypothesis of MCAR providing in this way further evidence on the
robustness of our estimates.
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Table 6: Results of Logistic Regression Analysis: factors influencing the
probability of missing value for monthly potential production of cocaine in
Colombia for year 2008
Logit
Constant 2.575*
(1.562)
Liquid precursors -0.056
(0.054)
Solid precursors 0.034
(0.043)
Employees -0.041
(0.037)
Ovens 0.001
(0.023)
Hydrochloric acid -0.001
(0.001)
Instruments 0.002
(0.027)
Hectares -0.004
(0.049)
Cocabase 0.002
(0.003)
Coca leaves 0.182
(0.174)
Processed Coca leaves -0.190
(0.223)
Regional controls Included
Time controls Included
Counteracting force controls Included
Log-likelihood -183.121
χ2(29) 68.762
Mc Fadden’s R2 0.194
N 328
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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B Functional Form
To account for the possible bias of our estimates arising from the form of the
function linking monthly potential production of cocaine to the inputs, we
estimate a nonparametric additive regression model (Yatchew, 1998) which
is able to trace the dependence between cocaine potential production and the
inputs of production without specifying in advance the function relating the
response to the predictors. In particular, we estimate the following model:
LPotentialProductioni = β0 +
4∑
k=1
mkxik + γ
TZi + i
where mˆk(.) are smoothing splines for the relevant covariates of our model
obtained by the minimisation of a penalised sum of squares:
SS∗(h) =
n∑
i=1
[yi −m(xi)]2 + h
∫ xmax
xmin
[m′′(x)]2dx
where h is a smoothing parameter arising from the minimisation of the mean-
squared error of the fit via generalised cross-validation (Wood, 2004).
Tabel 7 reports the results of the additive nonparametric model where
dummy regressors are included in a linear form as they act as controls. We
compute the estimate of Colombian total cocaine production in 2008 follow-
ing the procedure presented above. Also in this case, if we subtract 1.96 times
the standard error to the point estimate we get a total amount of cocaine
production in 2008 much higher than the one provided in official statistics by
the UNODC or ONDCP (450 metric tons), thus supporting our claim that
production of cocaine is actually under-estimated by official public agencies.
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Table 7: Results of Additive Non Parametric Analysis: factors influencing
the monthly potential production of cocaine in Colombia for year 2008
edf Ref.df F
LSolidPrecursors 1 1 8.433***
LEmployees 1 1 5.262**
LOvens 2.1 2.1 1.92
LLiquidPrecurors 7.6 7.6 3.320***
Regional controls Included
Time controls Included
Counteracting force con-
trols
Included
N 166
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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C Outliers
Another bias may arise from the presence of few highly productive units in
our data. In particular, the distribution in the monthly level of potential
production of cocaine is highly skewed to the right, with a high number of
abnormally low productive units, and with a fat tail to the right due to a
non negligible number of highly productive laboratories. Moreover, for many
observations our dependent variable presents strong departure from the mean
value, thus calling for an evaluation at different points of the conditional
distribution. To cope with these problems, we estimate a quantile regression
model (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) of the following type:
Qq(LPotentialProductioni|xi) = β0 +
4∑
k=1
βkxik + γ
TZi + F
−1
ui
(q)
where Qq(LPotentialProductioni|xi) denotes the qth conditional quantile
function of the potential production of cocaine for laboratory i given a set of
covariates xi. F
−1
q (ui) represents the inverse of the distribution function of
error term ui while the other terms are the same as in equation (1).
Table 8 shows the results of the quantile regression evaluated at five
different quantiles (0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75 and 0.9). Apart from the coefficient of
liquid precursors, the significance and sign of other coefficients is in line with
the results obtained with the Cobb-Douglas specification. Output elasticities
tend to increase, as “solid precursors-cocaine” elasticity is now 0.7, while
“labour-cocaine” elasticity raises to 1.2. Nevertheless, estimates of total
cocaine production for 2008 is still higher than official estimates, even if we
take into consideration the lowest quantile in terms of potential production
(quantile 0.1 with an estimate of 999 mt for 2008). Indeed, to obtain an
estimate close to that provided by the UNODC (i.e. 430 mt) we need to rely
on the results from the quantile regression for the 0.25 quantile of laboratories
and subtract one standard error from the point estimate.
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Table 8: Results of Quantile Regression Analyses: factors influencing the
monthly potential production of cocaine in Colombia for year 2008
Quantiles
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Constant -7.047** -2.511 -3.815 -2.521 -3.937*
(3.073) (2.705) (2.355) (1.801) (2.014)
LSolidPrecursors 0.609*** 0.346 0.681*** 0.500** 0.465**
(0.228) (0.213) (0.236) (0.211) (0.220)
LLiquidPrecursors 0.033 0.224 0.123 0.066 0.001
(0.182) (0.160) (0.123) (0.103) (0.111)
LEmployees 2.029** 0.744 1.182* 1.169** 1.555***
(0.830) (0.699) (0.608) (0.475) (0.532)
LOven 0.027 -0.095 -0.146 -0.136 -0.036
(0.160) (0.143) (0.110) (0.094) (0.120)
Regions Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Time Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Count. force con-
trols
Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl. Incl.
Pseudo R2 0.56 0.4 0.28 0.34 0.39
N 166 166 166 166 166
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Robust standard errors, obtained via 500 bootstrap replications, are in parentheses.
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